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Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and
activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former
position of successful operation and solveny. When a distressed company is
placed under rehabilitation, the appointment of a management committee
follows to avoid collusion between the previous management and creditors it
might favor, to the prejudice of the other creditors. All assets of a corporation
under rehabilitation receivershp are held in trust for the equal benefit of all
creditors to preclude one from obtaining an advantage or preference over
another by the expedieny of attachment, execution or otherwise. As between
the creditors, the key phrase is equality in equity. Once the corporation
threatened by bankrupty is taken over by a receiver, all the creditors ought to
stand on equal footing. Not any one of them should be paid ahead of the
others. This is precise4 the reason for suspending all pending claims against
the corporation under receivershjo.
- Ruby Industrial Corporation et al. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 124185-87, 20 January 1998
Supreme Court Second Division
Sec.5. Rehabilitation Plan. - The rehabilitation plan shall
include xxx xxx xxx (b) the terms and conditions of such rehabilitation,
which shall include the manner of its implementation, giving due regard
to the interests of secured creditors; xxx
- Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC)
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STATUS OF SECURED CREDITORS
INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court's promulgation of the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation in 2000 ("Interim Rules"), unsecured
creditors have latched on to the oft-cited Ruby Industrial dictum' to assert a status of
equality with secured creditors with respect to rehabilitation plan payments. This
raises several threshold questions. Does giving "due regard" (as mandated in Rule
IV, Section 5(b) of the Interim Rules) to the interests of secured creditors
contemplate a prohibition against the use or distribution of the property
constituting the security under the terms of a court-approved rehabilitation plan? If
the use or distribution of the property constituting the security is permitted, could
secured creditors be "adequately protected", as contemplated in the Interim Rules,
against the erosion of their security interests? If so, what modes of judicial action
are permissible to abate or mitigate such erosion?
The extreme interpretation of the Ruby Industrial dictum can lead to
unsecured creditors claiming that "all assets" of the corporation under rehabilitation
form part of the entire corpus of assets from which rehabilitation plan payments are
made. All of these assets are purportedly "held in trust for the equal benefit of all
creditors to preclude one from obtaining an advantage or preference over another
by the expediency of attachment, execution or otherwise". Relying on the Ruby
Industrial dictum's claim of "equality is equity", unsecured creditors therefore insist
on their "equal" status with secured creditors for any payments to be made under
court-approved rehabilitation plans. Whether payments are to be sourced from
properties comprising security or other assets of the corporation, unsecured
creditors maintain that all such properties (secured or unsecured) form part of the
"distributable assets" of a corporation in a rehabilitation proceeding.
The result of this "extreme" interpretation of perceived "equality" under
the Ruby Industrial dictum is that secured creditors can end up losing the
property/ies subject of their security to the distribution scheme approved under the
rehabilitation plan. Unsecured creditors can end up recovering their claims even
from the disposition of (or income from) secured assets - a pool of corporate assets
unsecured creditors would ordinarily not have had access to without corporate
rehabilitation proceedings. In the meantime, due to the Stay Order 2 in force during
rehabilitation, secured creditors will be unable to foreclose over their security. The
net effect of the "extreme" interpretation of the Ruby Industrial dictum is that
O ther recent citations of the Ru/ lndustrial dictum include: Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company v. ASB Holdings Inc. ct al., G.R. No. 166197, February 27, 2007; New Frontier Sugar
Corporation v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Iloilo City, et al., G.R. No. 165001, January 31,
2007; Spouses Sobrejuanite v. ASB DevelopmentT Corporation, G.R. No. 165675, September 30,
2005.
" "ee Rule IV, SLction 6 of the Interim Rules.
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unsecured creditors could also profit from a distribution or payment scheme
involving secured assets, reinforced by the suspension of enforcement of secured
creditors' foreclosure rights. At its worst, the "extreme" interpretation of "equality"
the Ruby Industrial dictum could be basis for rehabilitation courts to approve
rehabilitation plans that dispose of secured assets (without corresponding
replacement) and transmit the proceeds of disposition to all creditors, secured or
unsecured. Since courts are authorized under the Interim Rules to a "cramdown"
of the rehabilitation plan even over the objections of creditors, 3 there is no
guarantee that secured creditors' security interests could be preserved during
rehabilitation. By the time rehabilitation has terminated, there could be no property
(if any) over which secured creditors could exercise their foreclosure right.
Secured creditors can expectedly object to the decimation of their security
under a court-approved payments distribution to all creditors (secured or
unsecured) in the rehabilitation plan. Arguing from the standpoint of both policy
and law, secured creditors foreseeably can insist on the protection of their security
interests even during corporate rehabilitation.4  Otherwise, the perceived
destruction of security interests in corporate rehabilitation proceedings will
ultimately incentivize secured creditors to immediately initiate insolvency
proceedings against the subject corporation, in order to enable secured creditors to
maximize recovery on their loans to the corporation and the security intended to
guarantee such loans.
Clearly, the interpretation and application of the Ruby Industrial dictum is a
pivotal case for judicial balancing of interests,5 and an opportunity for courts to
review the relative status of secured and unsecured creditors in corporate
rehabilitations under the Interim Rules. Part I of this paper examines the
jurisprudential antecedents of the Ruby Industrial dictum in relation to the content
Interim Rules, Rule IV, Section 23.
4 See Villanueva, Cesar L. Judtcal Aivim in Commerdal Laws, at p. 8 found at:
http://www.deanclv.net/newsdata/13/oboect/iudicial activism.doc (last visited 5 January 2008):
"Perhaps the more controversial areas of the Interim Rules are those that have
constitutional repercussion, thus:
(a) Lumping together both secured and unsecured creditors and making
their vote to the adoption of the rehabilitation plan a condition precedent; and
(b) Non-protection of the property value of secured creditors under the
rehabilitation plan with the cramdown power of the Regional Trial Courts
xxx xxx xxx
As the argument goes, secured creditors have property rights under their existing
security arrangements with the debtor that cannot be put asunder without their consent
or unless in exchange for valuable consideration that preserves at least the value of their
property rights."
See Kahn, Peter L. The Poktics of Unregulation: Pubic Choice and the Limits of Government, 75
CORNELL L. REv. 280 (anuary 1990).
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and purpose of the "due regard" provision of the Interim Rules (and comparable
provisions in the former SEC Interim Rules on Corporate Recovery). In Part II,
the scope of the "due regard" provision is also explored from comparative
international best practices on corporate rehabilitations and/or reorganizations to
determine the relative status of secured and unsecured creditors in these types of
proceedings. As will be later shown, there appears to be a heavy legal
preponderance in favor of maintaining and preserving security interests to
accomplish the objects and purposes of corporate rehabilitations. Both
international practice and Philippine jurisprudence affirm that security interests
should not be destroyed in corporate rehabilitation.
Part III of this paper then uses a basic efficiency allocation model for
courts to consider before approving rehabilitation plans that call for distribution of
properties comprising security in order to pay off all of the corporation's creditors,
secured or unsecured. The question of distribution is ultimately one of efficiency in
the allocation of corporate resources for creditor payments and corporate expenses
- how best to derive the optimal distribution of corporate assets in payment to
creditors (secured or unsecured) that most feasibly ensures the corporation's
restoration to financial and operational viability. The Pareto efficient allocation for
courts to consider in the payment distribution under a rehabilitation plan is clearly
the allocation when "there is no way to make some individual better off without
making someone else worse off".6
As will be subsequently shown, however, the Interim Rules (specifically the
"due regard" and "adequate protection" clauses in Rule 4, Section 5(b) and Rule 4,
Section 12 of the Interim Rules) create an in-built constraint that forces courts to
choose a Pareto-efficient allocation in the interior of the Pareto set or contract
curve, and not at the origin (where one set of creditors enjoys full recovery from
secured assets to the complete exclusion of the other set of creditors). The courts,
as the virtual "auctioneer" in the "exchange" between secured and unsecured
creditors (best exemplified in the creditors' meetings with the rehabilitation
receiver), can set the "relative prices" for creditor recovery on their claims -
through court approval of valuation of corporate assets, court approval of the
estimated debt burden of the corporation under rehabilitation, and, among others,
court-sanctioned 'transaction costs' that make it incrementally difficult for creditors
to recover the full amount of their claim from the corporation. While Pareto
efficiency can theoretically contemplate a situation where one set of creditors
(unsecured creditors) are able to recover the full amount of their claim from both
secured and unsecured assets of the corporation while secured assets can be
exhausted under the payment scheme in the rehabilitation plan, the Interim Rules
prevent this situation by prohibiting the destruction of security interests.
Thus, as will be seen from international best practices, Philippine
jurisprudence, and economic efficiency analysis, rehabilitation courts cannot
SSee ',ARthN, I AIR. IN NiI I A)I,\'r MI(:I ()I( :)N(OMICS." (2-1 cd., 1990.). at 480.
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interpret the Ruby Industrial dictum in a manner that permits the obliteration or
destruction of assets comprising the security, without requiring the corporation
subject of rehabilitation to replace such assets with others comparable in value. The
"equality is equity" dictum in Ruby Industrial simply contemplates a stay in the
enforcement of claims of all creditors, whether secured or unsecured. It cannot
authorize the distribution of secured assets to all creditors (secured or unsecured)
without a corresponding and appropriate replacement of such assets. Rehabilitation
does not intend the destruction of security interests.
I. RETRACING THE RUBYINDUSTRIAL DICTUM: FROM
SEC CORPORATE RECOVERY RULES AND ALEMAR'S SIBAL & SONS,
TO THE INTERIM RULES AND NEW FRONTIER
Ruby Industrial Corp. et al v. Court of Appeal et aL, (hereafter, Ruby Industria)7
was decided by the Second Division of the Supreme Court two (2) years before its
promulgation of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitations. The
case originated from a Petition for Suspension of Payments filed by Ruby Industrial
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1983. When the SEC
declared Ruby Industrial under suspension of payments, Ruby Industrial was
enjoined, pending hearing on the Petition, from disposing of its properties or from
making payments outside of the necessary or legitimate expenses of its business.
After the SEC Hearing Panel approved the rehabilitation plan proposed by
Ruby Industrial's majority stockholders ("Benhar/Ruby plan"), the minority
stockholders appealed. The SEC en banc then issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of the Benhar/Ruby plan. The Supreme Court
later upheld the injunction.
Problems arose when it was discovered that Ruby Industrial had partly
implemented the Benhar/Ruby plan before its approval by the SEC Hearing Panel.
One of Ruby Industrial's secured creditors (Far East Bank & Trust Company, or
FEBTC) had been paid off, and FEBTC had executed a deed of assignment in
favor of the majority stockholder, Benhar. Despite the injunction, Benhar paid off
Ruby Industrial's other secured creditors who later assigned their credits to Benhar.
Upon motion of Ruby Industrial's unsecured creditors, the SEC nullified the deeds
of assignment to Benhar. The SEC's orders were affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
and thereafter, the Supreme Court.
Ruby Industrial then submitted a revised rehabilitation plan to the SEC,
which provided for reimbursement to Benhar for payments it had made to Ruby
G.R. Nos. 124185-87,January 20, 1998.
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Industrial's secured creditors. Ruby Industrial's creditors objected, claiming that the
revised plan would legitimize the entry of Benhar as the new (and biggest) creditor
of Ruby, and the revised plan would put Ruby's assets beyond the reach of
unsecured creditors and the minority stockholders.
The SEC approved this revised plan. The Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that the revised plan circumvented its earlier decision nullifying the deeds of
assignment executed by Ruby's secured creditors in favor of Benhar.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, anchoring its
reasoning on the final declaration of nullity of the deeds of assignment. Such
assignments being entirely void, Benhar could not derive rights as against Ruby
Industrial as to entitle Benhar to payments as a 'creditor'. Otherwise stated, the
Court affirmed that Benhar could not assert any entitlement to repayment from
Ruby Industrial for Benhar's void act of paying off Ruby's secured creditors while
an injunction against such dispositions was subsisting. The Court then admonished,
in its now oft-cited dictum, that:
"Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and
activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former
position of successful operation and solvency. (citing New York Title and
Mortgage Co., vs. Friedman, 276 N.Y.S. 72, 153, Misc. 697) When a
distressed company is placed under rehabilitation, the appointment of a
management committee follows to avoid collusion between the previous
management and creditors it might favor, to the prejudice of the other
creditors. All assets of a corporation under rehabilitation receivership are
held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors to preclude one from
obtaining an advantage or preference over another by the expediency of
attachment, execution or otherwise. As between the creditors, the key phrase
is equality in equity. Once the corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken
over by a receiver, all the creditors ought to stand on equal footing. Not any
one of them should be paid ahead of the others. This is precisely the reason
for suspending all pending claims against the corporation under receivership.
(citing Araneta vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95253, July 10, 1992, 211
SCRA 390; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. IAC and BF Homes,
Inc., G.R. No. 74851, September 14, 1992,213 SCRA 830)."
Thus, as clearly seen from Ruby Industrial, the Supreme Court simply
affirmed.the prohibition against disposition of corporate assets in favor of one class
of creditors (secured creditors) before approval of the rehabilitation plan. The Ruby
Industrial dictum precisely affirms that what is suspended is the enforcement of
claims against the corporation, and thus, "not any one of [the creditors] should be
paid ahead of the others". The Ruby Industrial dictum did not destroy the distinction
between the claims of secured creditors and unsecured creditors.
The prohibition against the mere enforcement of claims is further affirmed
from the cases cited by the Supreme Court in the Ruby Industrial dictum:
2007]
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1) Araneta v. Court of Appeals
Araneta involved a claim arising from Philfinance's sale of a security
(promissory note) to the Aranetas. The security was under the custodianship of
Pilipinas Bank. When the Aranetas sought to recover the security from Pilipinas
Bank, the bank maintained that the security forms part of the assets of Philfinance
which have been frozen by the SEC upon declaring Philfinance under suspension
of payments and receivership. In affirming the bank's refusal to turn over the
security to the Aranetas, the Supreme Court held that the declaration of suspension
of payments upon Philfnance was a 'supervening' event, and that the Aranetas
should properly file their claim under the SEC proceedings. The Supreme Court
noted its decision in Alemar's Sibal & Sons Inc. v. Elbinias,9 to explain the rationale
for placing a corporation in a state of suspension of payments and receivership:
"It must be stressed that the SEC had earlier ordered the
suspension of all actions for claims against Alcmar's in order that all thc
assets of said petitioner could be inventoried and kt intact for the purpose
of ascertaining an equitable scheme of distribution among its creditors.
During rehabilitation receivership, the assets are held in trust for the equal
benefit of all creditors to preclude one from obtaining an advantage or preference
over another by the expediency of an attachment, execution or otherwise. For what
would prevent an alert creditor, upon learning of the receivership, from rushing
posthaste to the courts to secure judgments for the satisfaction of its claims to the
prejudice of the less alert creditors.
As between creditors, the key phrase is 'equality is equity (Central Bank vs.
Morfe, 63 SCRA 114, citing Ramisch vs. Fulton, 41 Ohio App. 443, 180 N.E. 735).'
When a corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken over by a receiver, all the
creditors should stand on an equal footing. Not anyone of them should be given
ay preference y payi one or some of them ahead of the others. This is precisely
the reason for the suspension of all pending claims against the corporation under
receivership. Instead of creditors vexing the courts with suits against the distressed
firm, they are directed to file their claims with the receiver who is a duly appointed
officer of the SEC."
As seen from the foregoing, what the Supreme Court simply intended in
stating that "all creditors should stand on equal footing" is the establishment of
"equality" based on an across-the-board prohibition against any enforcement of
claim by any creditor, secured or unsecured. Thus, this reasoning should infuse
judicial appreciation of the Ruby Industrial dictum. The Ruby Industrial dictum should
not be read as having destroyed security interests in corporate rehabilitation, or
G.R. No. 95253,July 10, 1992.
G.R. No. 75414,June 4, 1990. Imphasis and underscoring supplied.
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vesting unsecured creditors-with the same corpus of rights over secured assets as
secured creditors.
2) Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) et al."'
RCBC likewise affirms the same prohibition against enforcement of claims
by any creditor where a corporation is declared under suspension of payments. In
this case, BF Homes filed a Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration and
Suspension of Payments with the SEC. One of its creditors was RCBC. Before the
petition could be heard by the SEC, RCBC extrajudicially foreclosed on the
properties subject of BF Homes' real estate mortgage with RCBC. The properties
were auctioned off at a public sale, on the sheriffs' claim that the SEC had not yet
issued any injunction at the time of the sale. RCBC filed a petition for mandamus
to compel the delivery of the Certificate of Sale of the auctioned properties. The
trial court granted RCBC's petition. Thereafter, upon BF Homes' complaint with
the IAC for annulment of the trial court's judgment, the [AC set aside the writ of
mandamus issued and suspended issuance of new titles to RCBC pending
resolution of the rehabilitation petition with the SEC.
The Supreme Court denied RCBC's petition seeking annulment of the JAC
decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the prohibition on the enforcement (or
foreclosure) of the claim over the security pending rehabilitation:
"While it is recognized that RCBC is a preferred-creditor and
likewise the highest bidder at the auction sale, We have however stated that
whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such
preference, but as earlier stated, stand on equal footing with other creditors.
Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not o p orejudice 2hucreditors, or
cause discrimination among them. If foreclosure is undertaken despite the
fact that a petition for rehabilitation has been filed, the certificate of sale shall
not be delivered pendin rehabilitation. Likewise, if this has also been done,
no transfer of title shall be effected also, within the period of rehabilitation.
The rationale behind PD 902-A, as amended, is to effect a feasible and viable
rehabilitation. This cannot be achieved if one creditor is preferred over the
others.
In this connection, the prohibition against foreclosure attaches as
soon as a petition for rehabilitation is fied. Were it otherwise, what is to
prevent the petitioner from delaying the creation of the Management
Committee and in the meantime dissipate all its assets. The sooner the SEC
takes over and imposes a freeze on all the assets, the better for all
concerned.""
to G.R. No. 74851, September 14, 1992 (en banc).
11 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
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Clearly, the 'equality of footing' contemplated (between secured and
unsecured creditors)dis hinged on the uniform prohibition against the enforcement
of claims against the corporation pending rehabilitation. Read alongside its
jurisprudential antecedents in Alemar's Sibal & Sons Inc., Araneta, and RCBC, the
Ruby Industrial dictum should be understood simply as a prohibition against any
creditor's enforcement of a claim against the corporation pending rehabilitation
(and approval of a rehabilitation plan). None of these cases collapsed the
distinction between secured creditors and unsecured creditors. The rights of
secured creditors to foreclose over secured assets of the corporation (to the
exclusion) of unsecured creditors), remain intact, but are simply rendered
'unenforceable' during the pendency of corporate rehabilitation.
The foregoing interpretation is also consistent with the SEC Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Recovery ("SEC Corporate Recovery Rules"),12 which
antedated the Interim Rules. The SEC Corporate Recovery Rules were
promulgated "to carry out the objectives of Presidential Decree No. 902-Al3and to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious, and inexpensive settlement of
cases". 14 Section 2-10 of the SEC Corporate Recovery Rules expressly classifies
creditors into secured and unsecured creditors.
Rule IV of the SEC Corporate Recovery Rules provides for the remedy of
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation can be initiated by the debtor corporation, its creditors,
or stockholders, so long as it is -shown that the debtor corporation is "insolvent
because its assets are not sufficient to cover its liabilities, or [which is] technically
insolvent under Section 3-12 of these Rules, but which may still be rescued or
revived through the institution of some changes in its management, organization,
policies, strategies, operations, or finances."' Is While the SEC Corporate Recovery
Rules does not carry a similar "due regard" provision for secured creditors as
indicated in the Interim Rules,' 6 the same SEC Corporate Recovery Rules recognize
12 SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, December 21, 1999.
1- Presidential Decree No. 902-A ("REORGANIZATI()N OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION WITH ADDITIONAL POWERS AND PLACING THE SAID
AGENCY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF THE OFFICE OF TH
PRESIDENT"), March 11, 1976, as amended.
"SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, Rule I, Section 1-2.
's Ibid, at Rule IV, Section 4-1.
' See Interim Rules, Rule IV, Section 5(b) alongside Rule IV, Section 4-18 of the SEC Rules
of Procedure on Corporate Recovery:
Rule IV, Section 5 of the Interim Rules Rule IV, Section 4-18 of the SEC Rules of
of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation Procedure on Corporate Recovery
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that a secured creditor is entitled to "adequate protection over property securing its
claim."t 7
Section 5. Rehabilitation Plan. - The
rehabilitation plan shall include: a) the desired
business targets or goals and the duration and
coverage of the rehabilitation; b) the terms and
conditions of such rehabilitation which shall
include the manner of its implementation,
giving due regard to the interests of
secured creditors; (c) the material financial
commitments to support the rehabilitation
plan; (d) the means for the execution of the
rehabilitation plan, which may include
conversion of the debts or any portion thereof
to equity, restructuring of the debts, dadon en
pago, or sale of assets or of the controlling
interest; (c) a liquidation analysis that estimates
the proportion of the claims that the creditors
and shareholders would receive if the debtor's
properties were liquidated; and (f) such other
relevant information to enable a reasonable
investor to make an informed decision on the
feasibility of the rehabilitation plan. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Section 4-18. Rehabilitation Plan. - The
petitioner shall attach to the petition the
proposed rehabilitation plan. If not so
attached, the petitioner shall subniit it within
such time as the Commission may allow
serving notice to each creditor of record that
the Rehabilitation Plan has been filed with the
Commission and that a copy thereof served on
the Interim Receiver is available for
examination and reproduction. The
Rehabilitation Plan shall include (a) the desired
business targets or goals and the duration and
coverage of the rehabilitation, (b) the terms
and conditions of such rehabilitation which
shall include the manner of its implementation,
(c) the material financial commitments to
support the Rehabilitation Plan, (d) a
repayment plan for all debts and liabilities
including the source of repayment, (e) the
means for the execution of the Rehabilitation
Plan, which may include conversion of the
debts or any portion thereof to equity,
restructuring of the debts, dadon enpago, or sale
of the assets or of the controlling interest; and
(0 such other relevant information to enable a
reasonable investor to make an informed
decision on the feasibility of the Rehabilitation
Plan.
'1 See Rule IV, Section 4-10 of the SEC Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery:
"Section 4-10. Refief from, moification or termination of Suspension Order.. - The Commission
may, on motion or motu prop co, terminate, modify, or set conditions for the continuance of the
suspension order, or relieve a claim from the coverage thereof upon showing that (a) any of thc
allegations in the petition, or any of the contents of any attachment, or the verification thereof has
ceased to be true, (b) a creditor does not have adequate protection over property securing
its claim, or (c) the debtor's secured obligation is more than the fair market value of the property
subject of the stay and such property is not necessary for the rehabilitation of the debtor.
For purposes of this section, the creditor shall lack adequate protection if it can be shown
that:
a. the debtor is not honoring pre-existing agreement with the creditor to keep the
property insured;
b. the debtor is failing to take commercially reasonable steps to maintain the property; or
2007]
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Significantly, the SEC Corporate Recovery Rules (in conjunction with
Presidential Decree No. 902-A) also appear to affirm the preservation of security
interests during rehabilitation:
"May encumbered assets be disposed of?
In almost all rehabilitation proceedings, infusion of additional
capital is an indispensable ingredient of the rehabilitation strategy. I Iowever,
it is next to impossibility to find a bank willing to lend that additional capital.
An investor may become interested but, as demonstrated in the case of PAL,
that situation is rare.
Faced with the formidable predicament, the corporation may have
no choice but to dispose of some assets and use the proceeds to operate the
business. There will be no problem if the assets are unencumbered. But
complications will develop if they are. May the Commission allow the
disposition of encumbered assets?
I believe that the Commission has the authority to allow the lifting
of the lien from an encumbered asset but only when a substitute security is
given to the creditor. Rehabilitation, as a rule, merely postones the Liht of
the creditors to fireclose on the security. I d= not work to remove the
lien altocether. ''"
c. depreciation of the property is increasing to the extent that the creditor is
undersecured.
Upon showing of a lack of adequate protection, the Commission shall order the debtor to (a)
make arrangements to provide for the insurance or maintenance of the property, (b) to make
payments or otherwise provide an additional or replacement lien to the creditor to offset the
extent that the depreciation of the property is increasing the extent that the creditor is
undersecured. Provided, however, that the Commission may deny the creditor the remedies in
this paragraph if such remedies would prevent the continuation of the debtor as a going concern
or otherwise prevent the approval and implementation of a Rehabilitation Plan."
18 " oncepcion, l)anilo I. Cotporate Rehabilitation: The Phiippine Experience, found at:
http: / /web.worldbank.org/WBSI'F11 ,/IXTERNAL/TOPICS/LAtWANDIUSTICE/G ILD/ O..c
ontentMDK:20154076-menuPK:146222-pagePK:64065425-1piPK:162156-theSitePK:215006.0
0.html. (last visited 15 January 2008) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.).
See also Villanueva, Cesar I.. Revisiting the Phiippine 'Laws" on Corporate Rehabiltation,
Professorial Chair Paper for the JUSTICE CARMEL() AlVENDIA ('HAIR IN
COMMER(IAL L.AW for School Year 1998-1999:
"What may be clearly implied from the rulings of the Supreme Court is that the whole issue
of "equality" among the creditors, both secured and unsecured, during the process of
rehabilitation, should pertain only to the non-availment of actions on claims against the
petitioning creditor during the period that rehabilitation is being pursued. But it cannot mean an
actual treatment of the claims as "equal" to forgo the existence of contractual security rights in
favor of secured creditors. A rehabilitation plan that "impairs" or destroys such security rights
cannot be affirmed without the consent of the individual sccurLd creditors; otherwise it would be
a constitutional violation of due process and non-impairment clause."
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Likewise, the destruction of security interests (or any collapse in the
distinction between secured and unsecured creditors) does not appear to be
consistent with the express provisions of the Interim Rules, mandating that
rehabilitation plans must give 'due regard' to the interests of secured creditors, and
providing for adequate protection for secured creditors thus:
"Sec. 5. Rehabtilitation Plan. - The rehabilitation plan shall include:
a) the desired business targets or goals and the duration and coverage of the
rehabilitation; b) the terms and conditions of such rehabilitation which shall
include the manner of its implementation, giving due regard to the interests
of secured creditors; (c) the material financial commitments to support the
rehabilitation plan; (d) the means for the execution of the rehabilitation plan,
which may include conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to equity,
restructuring of the debts, dadon enpago, or sale of assets or of the controlling
interest; (e) a liquidation analysis that estimates the proportion of the claims
that the creditors and shareholders would receive if the debtor's properties
were liquidated; and (0 such other relevant information to enable. a
reasonable investor to make an informed decision on the feasibility of the
rehabilitation plan.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.12. Re/ffrom, Modification, or Termination of Stay Order. - The
court may, on motion or motupropnio, terminate, modify, or set conditions for
the continuance of the stay order, or relieve a claim from the coverage
thereof upon showing that: (a) any of the allegations in the petition, or any
of the contents of any attachment, or the verification thereof has ceased to
be true; (b) a creditor does not have adequate protection over property
securing its claim; or (c) the debtor's secured obligation is more than the fair
market value of the property subject of the stay and such property is not
necessary fior the rehabilitation of the debtor.
Ior purposes of this section, the creditor shall lack adequate
protection if it can be shown that:
a. the debtor fails or refuses to honor a pre-existing agreement with the
creditor to keep the property insured;
b. the debtor fails or refuses to take commercially reasonable steps to
maintain the property; or
c. the property has depreciated to an extent that the creditor is
undcrsccured.
Upon showing of a lack of adequate protection, the court shall
order the rehabilitation receiver to (a) make arrangements to provide for the
insurance or maintenance of the property, or (b) to make payments or
otherwise provide additional or replacement security such that the obligation
is fully secured. If such arrangements are not feasible, the court shall modify.
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the stay order to allow the secured creditor lacking adequate protection to
enforce its claim against the debtor; Provided, however, That the court may deny
the creditor the remedies in this paragraph if such remedies would prevent
the continuation of the debtor as a going concern or otherwise prevent the
approval and implementation of a rehabilitation plan."' 9
The Supreme Court has not had occasion yet to interpret the foregoing
"due regard" and "adequate protection" clauses of the Interim Rules. The Court,
however, has consistently upheld the preferred status of secured creditors over
unsecured creditors in relation to properties subject of security, clarifying that what
is merely suspended during rehabilitation proceedings is the enforcement of the
claim over the property constituting the security. As the Court clarified in
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. ASB Holdings Inc. et al,21 mortgage liens are
retained in corporate rehabilitations, and what is only suspended is the creditor's
enforcement of such preference:
"We are not convinced that the approval of the Rehabilitation Plan
impairs petitioner bank's lien over the mortgaged properties. Section 6(c) of
P.D. No. 902-A provides that 'upon appointment of a management committee,
rehabiitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for c/aims against
corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before
any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended "
By that statutory provision, it is clear that the approval of the
Rehabilitation Plan and the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver merely suspend
the actions for claims against respondent corporations. Petitioner bank's preferred
status over the unsecured creditors relative to the mortgage liens is retained, but the
enforcement of such preference is suspended. The loan agreements between the
parties have not been set aside and petitioner bank may still enforce its preference
when the assets of ASB Group of Companies will be liquidated. Considering that
the provisions of the loan agreements are merely suspended, there is no impairment
of contracts, specifically its lien in the mortgaged properties.
As we stressed in RiZal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, such suspension "shall not prejudice or render ineffective the status of a
secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor", for what P.D. No.
902-A merely provides is that all actions for claims against the distressed
corporation, partnership or association shall be suspended. This arrangement
provided by law is intended to give the receiver a chance to rehabilitate the
corporation if there should still be a possibility for doing so, without being
unnecessarily disturbed by the creditors' actions against the distressed corporation.
However, in the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and the claims against
the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured
19 Interim Rules, Rule IV, Sections 5 and 12. Emphasis supplied.
21 See Philippine Airlines Inc. et al. v. Zamora, G.R. No. 166996, February 6, 2007; Philippine
Airlines Inc. v. Philippine Airlines Employees Association, G.R. No. 142399,june 19, 2007.
21 G.R. No. 166197, February 27, 2007.
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creditors, like petitioner bank, shall enjoy preference over the unsecured
creditors."22
Notably, the Supreme Court held in Metrobank that there was no
impairment of security interests under the approved rehabilitation plan, since the
dacton en pago therein contemplates obtaining the consent of the secured creditors to
the disposition of the mortgaged properties. Since the dadon en pago transactions
would be based on "mutually agreed upon terms" between the debtor-corporation
and secured creditors, the rehabilitation plan did not per se appear to indicate
impairment of the secured creditors' property and/or contractual rights. (Clearly,
this was not even an instance involving a "cramdown" upon secured creditors of a
payment distribution scheme calling for disposition of the corporation's mortgaged
properties.)
Finally, under the Interim Rules, the suspension of enforcement of creditor
claims comes into effect from the issuance of the Stay Order appointing a
rehabilitation receiver. As the Court explained in New Frontier Sugar Corporation v.
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 39, et al,23 (a case whose original incidents
were already covered by the Interim Rules), the suspension of enforcement of
creditor claims applies to both secured and unsecured creditors:
"Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and
activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former
position of successful operation and solvency (citing Ruby Industrial Corporation
v. CoArt of Appeal, 348 Phil. 480, 497 (1998). Presently, the applicable law on
rehabilitation petitions filed by corporations, partnerships or associations,
including rehabilitation cases transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission to the RTACs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799 or the
Securities Regulation Code, is the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (2000).
Under the Interim Rules, the RTC, within five (5) days from the
filing of the petition for rehabilitation and after finding that the petition is
sufficient in form and substance, shall issue a Stay Order appointing a
Rtehabilitation Receiver, suspending enforcement of all claims, prohibiting
transfers or encumbrances of the debtor's properties, prohibiting payment of
outstanding liabilities, and prohibiting the withholding of supply of goods
and services from the debtor. Any transfer of property or any other
conveyance, sale, payment, or agreement made in violation of the Stay Order
or in violation of the Rules may be declared void by the court upon motion
or motu proprio.
Further- the St Order is effective both aimns secured and
unsecured creditors. This is in harony with the lrincilie of "equality is
1gui& enunciated in Alemar's & alSons. Inc. v. Elbinias thus:
2Emphasis and italics in the original.
2. G.R. No. 165001,January 31, 2007.
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During rehabilitation receivership, the assets are
held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors to preclude
one from obtaining an advantage or preference over another by
the expediency of an attachment, execution or othenvise. For
what would prevent an alert creditor, upon learning of the
receivership, from rushing posthaste to the courts to secure
judgments for the satisfaction of its claims to the prejudice of
the less alert creditors.
As btween creditors, the key phrase is "equality is
eluity." When a corporation threatened by bankruptcy is taken
over by a receiver, all the creditors should stand on an equal
footing. Not anyone of them should be given any preference by
paying (me or soime of them ahead of the others. This is
precisely the reason for the suspension of all pending claims
against the corporation under receivership. Instead of creditors
vexing the courts with suits against the distregsed firm, they arc
directed to file their claims with the receiver who is a duly
appointed officer of the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, the suspension of the enforcement of all claims
against the corporation is subject to the rule that it shall commence only
from the time the Rehabilitation Receiver is appointed. Thus, in Rizal
Commernial Bankin& Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court upheld
the right of RCBC to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage on some of BF
I tomes' properties, and reinstated the trial court's judgment ordering the
sheriff to execute and deliver to RCBC the certificate of- auction sale
involving the properties. The Court vacated its previous Decision rendered
on September 14, 1992 in the same case, finding that RCBC can rightfully
move for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage since it was done on
October 16, 1984, while the management committee was appointed only on
March 18, 1985. The Court also took note of the SEC's denial of the
petitioner's cons6lidated motion to cite the sheriff and RCBC for contempt
and to annul the auction proceedings and sale."
As seen from the foregoing recent clarification by the Supreme Court, it
appears clear that the "equality is equity" dictum in Ruby Industrial (traceable to
Akrar's Sibal & Sons) only refers to the stay order, or the suspension of
enforcement of claims against the corporation. It should not be construed as
having destroyed the distinction between the rights of secured creditors vis-a-vis
unsecured creditors.
Thus, as seen from the jurisprudential antecedents of the Ruby Industrial
dictum, the SEC Rules on Corporate Recovery, the express provisions of the
Interim Rules, and recent jurisprudence, there is no basis for an "extreme"
interpretation of the Ruby Industrial dictum by rehabilitation courts. The perceived
"equality" of secured and unsecured creditors in rehabilitation proceedings stems
from the uniform suspension of enforcement of claims of all creditors. This
"equality" does not extend to the use and disposition of secured assets (and without
replacement or comparable substitution of the assets) to pay off all creditors under
the rehabilitation plan, whether secured or unsecured. Security interests must still
be respected and preserved during corporate rehabilitation.
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II. INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES ON CORPORATE
REHABILITATIONS/REORGANIZATIONS: RECONCILING THE 'PARI PASSU'
DOCTRINE WITH THE RUBY INDUSTRIAL DICTUM
The "extreme" interpretation of "equality" between creditors classes
(secured and unsecured) in the Rub Industrial dictum has led to the argument that
such "equality" permits the distribution of all corporate assets (including secured
assets) for indiscriminate payment to all creditors (secured or unsecured). It has
been argued that this "equality" is, in reality, consistent with the doctrine of pari
passu treatment of creditors.
As internationally applied and understood in corporate restructuring
proceedings, however, the pari passu doctrine contemplates equality only for classes
of creditors that are similarly situated. The pari passu clause is a basic financial
covenant which, in modem cross-border credit instruments, typically states that the
loan (to which the clause is attached) will rank equally in right of payment with all
other similarly situated loans of the borrower: 24
"In a corporate context, this [paripassuJ clause is a statement that
on a forced insolvency, debts are, by law, paid ratably. It does not mean that
one debt cannot be paid before another in time.
In the state context, the meaning of the clause is uncertain because
there is no hierarchy of payment which is legally enforced under a
bankruptcy regime. Probably the clause means that on a de facto inability to
pay external debt as it falls due, one creditor will not be preferred by virtue of
.an allocation of international monetary assets achieved by a method going
beyond contract; and (perhaps) that there will be no discrimination between
creditors of the same class in the event of insolvency."2 5
Clearly, the paripassu clause does not mandate uniform payment treatment
for what are obviously different creditor classes (secured and unsecured creditors).
In devising a payment scheme during corporate restructuring, clear distinctions
must be drawn between secured creditors and unsecured creditors, who not only
24 Buchheit, Lee C. and Jeremiah S. Pamn, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,
found at http://wvw.law.gortdwn.edu/intemaional/documents/Pampdf (last visited on 31 March
2005); See also WOOD, PHILIP R. LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1980), at Sec.
6.3(2), pp. 155-156: "In the context of a corporate loan, the undertaking Eparipassu clause] is to be
construed as a commitment or a warranty that on an insolvent liquidation or a forced distribution
of assets unsecured creditors will be entitled to pro rata payment, and also that, on the occasion
of judicial compromises or agreed debt settlements- the bondholders will not be discriminated
aginst." (Underscoring supplied.)
21 WOOD, PHILIP R., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIQNAL FINANCE PROJECT FINANCE,
SUBORDINATED DEBT & STATE LOANS (1995), at Sec. 16-12, p. 165. (Underscoring supplied.)
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bear radically different legal rights and creditor status, but are also motivated by
disparate interests.26 As such, the pari pasmru clause is intended to address only
borrower actions having the effect of changing the legal ranking of the debt or
perhaps the earmarking of assets or revenue streams to benefit specific creditors.27
Notably, the 2004 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (which includes the concept of
corporate reorganization/restructuring/rehabilitation), defines the pari parsu clause
as "the principle according to which similarly situated creditors are treated and
satisfied proportionately to their claim out of the assets of the estate available for
distribution to creditors of their rank."
The importance of the distinction between the rights of secured and
unsecured creditors has constitutional dimensions. As recently argued by scholars
and encapsulated in United States Supreme Court decisions, secured creditors have
a property right in "hav[ing] the value of the collateral applied for payment of the
secured creditor's claim". 29 Where there is an impairment of this property right in a
corporate reorganization plan that jeopardizes such property right (e.g. through a
'most egregious' delay in the enforcement of a stay against a secured creditor during
corporate reorganization, for example), it has been argued that there is a violation
of the Takings Clause.3"
2 WOOD, PHILIP R., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY (1995 ed.), Secs. 1-15-1-44, pp. 10-26.
27 Ibid., at p.5; See also distinctions betvieen-.lasses of creditors in corporate reorganizations
(or rehabilitations) in FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2000
ed.), Volume 15A, Chapter 63, Sections 7634.27 to 7634.42. See also ScoTr, HAL S.,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY ABD REGULATION (Foundation Press, 131h
ed., 2006), at pp. 840-843.
Z" UNCITRAL Lqgislative Guide on Insolveng Law, p. 6. Found at:
http://www.iiiglobal.org/organizations/uncitral/UNCITRAL LeUislative Guide Insolvency La
3 (last visited 15 January 2008)
29 Forrester, Julia Patterson. Bankrpt.yTakng.r, 51 FLA. L. REV. 851 (December 1999),
at 877. This paper provides a comprehensive and updated refutation of the claim that security interests
could be completely invalidated in a bankruptcy or corporate reorganization setting, which claim was
discussed in the landmark article of Rogers, James Steven, The lmpairment of Securrd Crditorr' Rigbtr in
Reotgani,-ton: A Study of the Rekatotrhip Betaen the Fiftb Amendment and the Baxknepty Clau.r, 96 HARV. L REV.
973, 973 (1983).
.1' Ibid, at 911:
"Current bankruptcy law for the most part protects property rights, including the rights of
secured creditors. Secured creditors do experience delay in bankruptcy in their ability to realize
upon their security. However, only the most egregious case of delay could present a
successful takings claim. Security interests are subject to avoidance in bankruptcy, but only in
limited circumstances that for various reasons do not present a takings problem.
Scholars have suggested that prospective legislation that invalidates security interests in
bankruptcy would not create a takings problem. However, the constitutionality of this invalidation
proposal is doubtful. All property owners would be affected by legislation that invalidated security
interests in bankruptcy because they would not be able to create a security interest that could
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It should be noted further that international practices on corporate
rehabilitations, restructuring, or reorganizations collectively affirm that the
distinction between creditor classes (secured and unsecured) must be preserved in
any court-approved payment distribution scheme.31 In the United States, corporate
survive a bankruptcy filing. The right to convey a security interest may be a sufficiently
important strand in the bundle of property rights that its abrogation would constitute an
impermissible taking. If, because of limitations on the availability of secured credit, the
invalidation proposal substantially interfered with the right of an owner to transfer land, it would
most certainly be an unconstitutional taking. In addition, the invalidation proposal may be
unconstitutional from the point of view of the secured creditor. Because the proposal
would appropriate the secured creditor's property rights rather than regulate them, a
court could find the proposal unconstitutional without reaching the ad hoc test of Penn
Central. Even if the ad hoc test is applicable, a court could find a taking. The extent of the
secured creditor's reasonable investment-backed expectations would be limited, but prior
notice should not eliminate investment-backed expectations altogether where the secured
creditor is not taking the security interest in order to create a takings claim and has no
ability to avoid the possibility of loss. Furthermore, the economic impact of the proposal
could be substantial, and the character of the regulation, destruction of the secured creditor's
property rights, would be extraordinary. As a result, the constitutionality of the invalidation
proposal is doubtful.
Although other proposals are not as onerous in affecting the property rights of owners
and 'secured parties, they do still raise substantial constitutional questions. The takings formula is
too fact dependent and takings law is still in too much of a muddle to make certain predictions
about its application. Scholars making these proposals are ignoring significant and complex
takings issues that may make their proposals unconstitutional. Since Professor Rogers' 1983
article, courts and scholars have made assumptions about the bankruptcy takings problem, most
of which are based on his conclusions. However, their assumptions are not correct. The Takings
Clause does limit the power of Congress to pass new bankruptcy legislation, even legislation that
is prospective. Security interests are interests in property, and new bankruptcy legislation cannot
redefine the property interest of a secured creditor. Changes in the treatment of secured creditors
in bankruptcy do affect property owners as well as secured creditors, and their rights must be
considered in assessing the constitutionality of new bankruptcy legislation, Finally, because the
takings formula, in the absence of a categorical taking, requires the application of a fact intensive
ad hoc test, the constitutionality of current limitations on the rights of secured creditors does not
mean that different limitations would also pass constitutional muster. When the correct
assumptions are made, the bankruptcy takings problem becomes much more complex and cannot
be dismissed with a short parag of current bankruptcy limitations on secured creditors. The
bankruptcy takings problem is still very much alive and must not be ignored." (Emphasis
supplied.)
3, See Phelan, Robin F. and W. I verett. The Wretched Refuse -- Leading the Foreign Corporation to
a Fresh Start in the United States, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 23 (Spring-Summer, 2005), at 36:
"The district court in Singer, discussed above, granted comity to the courts on the other side
of the Atlantic. Across the Pacific, the 1990s Asian financial crisis spurred interest in insolvency
and reorganization proceedings for Asian companies, and an increasing number of bankruptcy
opinions here are recognizing foreign proceedings over there. For examle. Bankruptcy ludga
Thomas E. Carlson recently recognized the Philippine rehabilitation law as worthy of
comity. in an unpublished opinion ("In re Ancillary Petition regarding Philippine
Airlines Inc., a Philippine Corporation, No. 98-3-2705-TC (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998).
Philippine Airlines Inc. (PALU, he national airline ofjth Republic of ths Philippines. filed
A petition for suspension of payments and corporate rehabilitation with the Philippine
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reorganizations expressly require a specification of creditor classes in the
formulation of corporate reorganization plans:
"§7634.30 )esignation of classes of claims
A plan of reorganization is required to designate classes of claims
and classes of interests. A claim or interest rn l placed in a particula ja
onlif it is substantially similar to the other claims rr interest, in the class.
The plan may, however, designate a separate class of claims consisting of
every unseccaed claim that is less than or reduced to an amount that the
court approves as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience.
Certain sorts of claims need not be designated, such as
administrative expenses, claims arising after the filing of an involuntary
petition and before the appointment of a trustee or the entry of an order for
relief, and certain claims for taxes and custom duties.
§ 7634.33 Designation of classes of interests
The reorganization plan must designate classes of interests.
Although the term "interest" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, it is
used to describe an ownership interest.
An interest may be placed in a particular class only if it is
substantially similar to the other interests in the class. ih plan must also
sp-ecify anyi classes o~f interest,,wic-a not impaired under the p-lan. and
ecifthe tatment of .n c off interests which impaired.
7634.36 Specification of claims or interests impaired
A reoranization must specify_ any class of claims or interests
which is not impaired under the plan. and specify the treatment of any class
of claims or interests which is impaired. The plan may impair or leave
unimpaired any class of claims, whether secured or unsecured, or any class of
interests.
Securities and Exchange Commission (PSEC . Thereafter, the foreign representative of PAl,
filed a section 304 petition in the Northern District of California, obtaining a preliminary
injunction prohibiting actions against PAl, and its property in the United States. Objecting
creditors noted a 1981 presidential decree of President Marcos that transferred jurisdiction over
suspension-of-payments proceedings from the Philippine courts to the PSE'. According to the
objecting creditors, the suspensioo-of-payments proceeding was not subject to Philippine
insolvency law, and thus not worthy of comity under section 304.
The Philippines Airline court disagreed. noting imit 1hat Philippine insolveny law
provides creditors procedures and protections similar to those found under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, includig riori of claims, appellate review, a first meeting of
creditors, an automatic sta. ygon gn plan confirmation. and recovery of preferences and
fraudulent transfers. xxx" (mphasis and underscoring supplied.)
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Fach claim or interest of a particular class must receive the same
treatment under the plan, unless the holder of a particular claim or interest
aprces to a less favorable treatment. A plan may desi ,mate a separate class of
claims consistinV only of unsecured claims less than a specified amount, or
reduced to an amount which the court finds reasonable and necessary for
administrative convenience. Therefore. small and unsecured claims may be
placed in a separate class and need not be accorded the same treatment as
large unsecured claims.
§ 7634.39 Priority claims
Claims for administrative expenses and claims arising during the
gap period must be paid in full on the effective date of the plan, unless the
holder of the claim agrees to a less favorable treatment. Tax claims may be
paid over a period of time, as may employee benefit claims, wage, salary and
commission claims, and claims for deposits on consumer purchases, under
prescribed conditions.
It is fundamental that creditors take priority over stockholders.
Even defrauded stockholders' claims are subordinate to the claims of general
unsecured creditors."
32
More importantly, international practice emphasizes that corporate
reorganizations or rehabilitations should not cause 'excessive interference' with the
security as to altogether deprive the secured creditors of benefit from such
security:3
3
"If there is a stay on the enforcement of security, the main points
to be considered are the period of the stay and whether the stay is limited to
assets essential to the continuing business which are idiosyncratic (not
securities, cash or ordinary commodities). The alleged object of the stay is to
keep the business together while the rehabilitation is allowed to work, e.g. by
preventing the mortgagee sale of the main factory, computer equipment, or
an essential patent or unfinished inventory. But the effect f excessive
interference in the u i ko the ce r f the benefit of the
securty: the whole pupose of security is that it should be available on the
insolvency f the debtor ad t if the jurisdiction destroys the
s when it is most needed- the value and ufil of security tself is
demoted. Accordingly jurisdictions have to decide whether they desire the
advantages of security or whether they prefer the draconian rehabilitation
procedure, although middle courses are possible, e.g. a stay on enforcement
for a limited period.
The stay causes problems for perishable assets; volatile assets, such
as securities, commodities, and foreign currency deposits, especially margin
12 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, (1995 ed.) Vol. 15A, p.
603, § 7634.30 to §7634.39. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
33 See also Norton Jr., William L. f 110:9 Treatment of Holdes of Secured Claims, 5 NORTON
BANKR. L. & PRAc. 2d § 110:9 (October 2007).
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collateral for market dealings; ships, aircraft and other assets which are in
need of special protection or which could attract an ."assets" bankruptcy
jurisdiction just because they happen to be there or which can be spirited
away to avoid a surprise attachment; liens covering small assets not essential
to the business; income-earning assets if the debtor can use the income, e.g.
rent from land and equipment leases, dividends and interest on securities,
recoveries on receivables, royalties and intellectual property rights (the
income may have been essential to service the creditors' interest); and
possessory pledges and liens since the security is lost if possession must be
surrendered.
Other factors are: (1) a stay results in the erosion of security if it
falls in value or if interest continues to pile up - the period of the stay is
germane; (2) whether the debtor can use the secured assets for the purpose
of the continuing business and the powers which the creditor has to preserve
the asset; (3) whether the debtor can substitute alternative secured assets in
order to retain some essential asset; (4) whether a plan can bind dissentient
secured creditors to an extension of the maturity of the debt or a reduction in
amounts or a change of currency; (5) whether the security is primed by the
costs of the administration (liabilities incurred in continuing the business,
super-priority loans, employees, taxes) so that the creditor's security is eroded
and its value highly unpredictable; (6) whether security expressed to cover
after-acquired property such as a floating charge over all present and future
assets or an aircraft mortgage over engines subsequently replaced can catch
assets acquired by the debtor post-commencement; (7) the degree of
protection given to secured creditors against unfair prejudice; (8) whether
cash collateral can be taken away in the interests of financing the business;
and (9) whether post-commencement interest continues to run and can be
added to the secured debt. A common problem is whether a creditor.who
has security over investments or receivables violates a stay if he receives
payment on the assets from the third party and applies it to the secured debt:
this would be a violation of the US stay in BC 1978 s 362." .
14 Wo)I, PIIII.11 R., COMI'AI VEAII: I,AW OF SICURITY AND GUARANI'.1S(1995 ed.), Chapter
11 ("Security and Rehabilitation Proceedings"), at pp. 152-153; See Woo, PIIIlu' R., PRINCHI'LFS
o1: INTEgRNATIONAI. INSOILVt:NC'Y (1995 ed.), at Chapter 11 ("Corporate Rehabilitation
Proceedings: Ik'ngland, France, Japan, United States) p. 186-187:
"Grounds for petition and ease of entry
11-7 General The key issue here is the case of entry into the proceedings - case of entry
prioritizes the formal proceedings over private work-outs. Factors are:
- whether the debtor must show actual insolvency or the likelihood
of insolvency, whether he is not required to prove insolvency at all, and
whether insolvency is a balance sheet test or a liquidity test or both. If the
objective of early rehabilitation is to be achieved before it is too late, the
debtor should not be required to show actual insolvency, but rather the
probability j f an impending insolvency:
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Where there is an erosion of the security interest under the
reorganization/rehabilitation plan, there must be 'adequate protection' given to the
affected (secured) creditor through corresponding liens or cash payments:
"11-12 Adequate protection Rather than allowing relief from the
stay, the court may order the creditor to bc given adequate protection of its
security interest, e.g. additional licns or cash payments to match the fall in
value. The basic protection given to secured creditors is that thcy must
receive indubitably adequate protection for their security.
The House Report indicated that the concept of adequate
protection is derived from the Fifth Amendment protection of property
interests and from a policy that secured creditors should not be deprived of
the benefit of their bargain, so that if the secured creditor does not get the
exact collateral (because, like a factory, it is needed for the debtor's business),
he must get the equivalent in value. Case law shows that the creditor has
adequate protection if he is over-secured (to the extent of the cushion) or has
a recoverable guarantee from a third party, but not usually if the guarantee is
unsecured. The US Supreme Court established in the Timbers case above
that, if the creditor is undcr-secured, the creditor is entitled to cash payments
(or the equivalent) if his collateral is decreasing in value, that he is not
entitled to compensation for loss of the ability to reinvest proceeds from a
foreclosure, and that the creditor should be granted relief from the stay if the
property is not necessary for an effective reorganization which is feasible and
in prospect."3
It is internationally recognized that judicial rehabilitations result in
"increased complication, confrontation, delay and cost". The heavy involvement of
professionals - lawyers, accountants and consultants - and the "confrontations and
litigation caused by a rigid statutory framework, by the compulsory quelling or
divestment of creditor rights" makes formal proceedings in judicial rehabilitations
- whether the debtor must show that survival is feasible so as to
avoid abuse of the process;
- whether entry is by court order or by unilateral initiation by the
debtor (Australia, but not Britain or the US). Judicial approval increases cost
bu controls abue and discourages an over-easy entQr with a view to
pronotin a work-out i.e. the proceeding is a a resort." (Underscoring
suplfied.)
. Ibid at pp. 156-157. Emphasis supplied. See Japanese practice in Tanaka, Wataru.
Extinguishing Security Interests: Secured Claims in Japanese Business Reoganization Law and Some PoAh
Implicationsfor U.S. Law, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 427 .(Spring 2006), at 428-435. In Japan, a
debtor can cancel security interests in any property necessary for continuation of its business by
paying the secured creditors the liquidation value of such property.
See aLro GROCI1AL, ALAN M. AND MEGAN K. MECHAK, PRACTICE MANUAL FOR TE
MARYLAND LAWYER, 3rd ed. with 2006 Update, Volume 1, Chapter 4 ("Bankruptcy"), (2006
ed.), at Part IV.G . (summary on Chapter 11 proceedings in the United States)."
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costly for all stakeholders.3' These inherent costs only make it all the more
imperative that distinctions betveen secured and unsecured creditors should be
built into the court's approval of the rehabilitation or reorganization plan. To do
othenvise would only invite further delay and cement opposition between creditor
classes - a situation prohibitive to the goal of expeditious, efficient, and non-
adversarial rehabilitation envisioned in the Interim Rules.
III. REHABILITATION COURTS AS 'AucTIONEERS' IN THE
'CREDITOR' EXCHANGE OF DEMANDS:
HOW THE PARETO-EFFICIENT SET OF ALLOCATIONS OF CORPORATE ASSETS
BETWEEN SECURED AND UNSECURED CREDITORS ARE CONSTRAINED BY
THE INTERIM RULES
Rehabilitation courts assume a more "interventionist" role in rehabilitation
proceedings than in traditional civil or criminal litigation. In corporate
rehabilitations, courts are mandated to approve rehabilitation plans that will most
feasibly restore the corporation to financial viability. This task calls for a calibration
of competing interests in the mode and manner of distribution of corporate assets:
1) the corporation's need for a sustainable supply of resources to support business
operations, generate profits, and improve shareholder value; 2) secured creditors'
demand for repayment of their loans, and in the interim (before full repayment), the
maintenance or preservation of their security interests; and 3) unsecured creditors'
demand for repayment of their loans. Clearly, thiis is not a pure system of "private
bargaining", which as envisioned under the Coase Theorem, should be the most
appropriate means of allocating resources when transactions costs are low.37
Instead, what transpires is a hybrid between private bargaining and public regulation
(through the rehabilitation court's approval and implementation of the
rehabilitation plan and the Interim Rules).
Certainly bargaining does take place in corporate rehabilitation, perhaps
even more so than most traditional litigation contexts. Under the Interim Rules, the
Rehabilitation Receiver may (and before submission of his evaluation of the
rehabilitation plan to the rehabilitation court) meet with the debtor, the creditors, or
any interested party "to discuss the plan with a view to clarifying or resolving any
matter connected therewith". 38  Prior to the court's final approval of the
rehabilitation plan, revisions can be submitted by creditors, any interested party, as
u, See (illo \V' ( )l, PlII.IIp R. ]IRiN(CIPI.I~ ( )F I NI-I/NAII( )N A.I+ NS( mI.VI'NCYR IN (:1IP1I.1S ( )1I
INTI:IRNA'lI()N,\I. INS()I .VBNCY. (1995 ed.), at Chapter 11 ("Corporate Rehabilitation
Proceedings: kngland, France,.lapan, United States"), pp. 302-303.
11 See (ooIt'lI. It. & TI IMAS L)I.I:N. ILA\' AND ]+CONNMICS (Pearson \ddison Wesley 2004.
411, cd.), at p. 89.
18 Interim Rules, Rule IV, Section 21.
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well as the debtor corporation. -9 Such "bargaining", therefore, occurs in a setting
institutionally-mandated under the Interim Rules. (As discussed elsewhere by other
scholars, such institutionally-mandated bargaining under corporate reorganization is
based on the social desirability of coordinating debt collection activities, as well as a
cost-reduction motivation to mitigate or prevent creditor conflict.*)
The bargaining process entails the resolution of several issues of valuation
(e.g. how much is the corporation's total debt burden; how much of the total debt
burden is owed to each creditor class; how much is the corporation's total assets;
and how much is the corporation's needed annual operational and capital expenses
to reach the targeted level of financial solvency as would take the corporation out of
rehabilitation). Parties' options for restructuring corporate debt can range from
debt cancellation or reduction, debt satisfaction (for less than the full amount, or
with "haircuts" borne by creditors), debt-for-debt exchanges, debt modification,
debt-for-equity exchanges, or capital contribution of debt.41  Given limited
resources to service corporate debt, creditors can foreseeably bring their own
valuations to the bargaining table, including the maximum portion of their credit
that they are willing to "retire" (or, as in some cases, convert to equity in the
corporation) for the sake of corporate rehabilitation. Following the Rehabilitation
Receiver's submission of his proposed rehabilitation plan and creditors' comments
and/or revisions to such plan, it is then the task of the rehabilitation court to
.1 bid at Rule IV, Section 22.
4' Longhofer, Stanley D. and Stephen R. Peters, Protection for Whom? Creditor Confict and
Bankrupty, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 249 (Fall 2004), at 273-274:
"xxx But, in the absence of an automatic stay on the unsecured creditor's debt-collection
efforts, it may be difficult after the fact to trace the line between the disposal of the assets serving
as collateral and the payments made to the unsecured creditors. Thus, even collateralized
claims depend on the basic elements of a bankruptcy system -- the automatic stay and
preference'provisions -- to ensure effective protection for the secured creditor.
There are private actions a secured creditor might take to protect its interests, even in the
absence of a bankruptcy system with these provisions. For example, it may impose restrictive
covenants on the firm's use of any assets serving as collateral, requiring prior approval before they
may be liquidated. Restrictions such as these, however, may prove more costly than they are
worth. By limiting the firm's ability to misuse the assets, the creditor may also hamper the firm's
ability to redirect these assets to their highest-valued use. In other words, the very restrictions the
creditor may require to protect its own interests may limit the firm's ability to maximize its profits.
Furthermore, covenants restricting the use of collateralized assets must be monitored if they are
to be effective in protecting the secured creditor's interests. Consequently, secured debt may be
no more effective in reducing the costs of coordination than seniority and coordination
covenants.
All of this suggests that, although collateral may effect coordination in some cases, it cannot
serve as a general replacement for a bankruptcy system that mandates creditor coordination.
Thus, our primary conclusion is reconfirmed: A mandatory bankruptcy law that ensures all
creditors will coordinate their liquidation activities ex post improves social welfare better than
private contracting solutions." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)




ascertain how to most efficiently allocate corporate resources (between debt
servicing and financing corporate expenses) towards the goal of rehabilitation.
"Efficient" public regulation (through the rehabilitation court's
enforcement of the Interim Rules) should therefore reduce the costs of enforcing
and implementing the eventual "agreement" between creditors (spanning secured
creditors, unsecured creditors, and suppliers) and the debtor corporation under the
rehabilitation plan.42 As the "public regulator", courts conceivably appear as the
most critical actors in the rehabilitation process. How rehabilitation courts will
decide on the sensitive issue of corporate asset/resource allocation between creditor
classes (and without sacrificing rehabilitation goals) is a veritable test case for
modeling judicial methodology and reasoning.4
Intuitively, an "effective" corporate rehabilitation should be "capable of
swift implementation, as uncomplicated and inexpensive as possible, and flexible,
providing alternative terms of dealing with the financial affairs of the company." 44
These intuitive generalities, however, are hardly informative for rehabilitation courts
tasked to ascertain what "efficiency" is in the allocation of corporate resources
during rehabilitation. Does "efficiency" embrace the extreme interpretation of the
Ruby Industrial dictum, which is that secured and unsecured creditors are on "equal
footing" with respect to the pool of resources from which their debts will be
serviced? Alternatively, does an "efficient" allocation mean that unsecured
creditors can, along with secured creditors, be paid from the proceeds of sales or
dispositions of secured assets, without the debtor corporation having to replace
such properties comprising the security?
A. THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
Answers to the foregoing questions depend on how rehabilitation courts
appreciate the concept of efficiency. Economic efficiency is described as "the best
use of limited resources given people's tastes."'45 Intuitively, the optimal quantity of
any good, ceter paribus, is that "at which the value placed by society on the marginal
unit equals its marginal social cost."'4f There is Pareto efficiency (also known as
42 See Ulen, Thomas S. Courts, Legislatures, and the General Theoy of Second Best in Law and
Economics, 73 0 II-KiNr. L. lRi:V. 189 (1998), at 198.
11 1 or an interesting model proposing cognitive reflection as the schema for judicial decision-
making, see (uthrie, C. ct al. Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. RIV. I
(November 2007).
44 Fisher, Richard. Rehabilitating Large and Complex Enterprises in Financial Dificulties,
DISCUSSION PAPI"-R BY Till: ClAilMAN OF PARINERS OF BLAKE DAWSON
WA]L)RON, Sydney, Australia, 8 April 2004 fiund at
htt2:// www.camc. ov.au/camac/camac.nsf/byl-eadfine/PDFSubmissions/Sfile/BDW.pdf (last
visited 27 December 2007).
4, BARR, N i: R)IAS. 'I: I J,0N(MICkS OF TIE WEIFARI S'I'ATIE (Oxford University Press, 3rd
ed., 1998), at 70.
4' Ibid,
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Pareto optimality or allocative efficiency) when resources cannot be allocated or
distributed in any other way without making someone else worse off.47 In a market
of exchange, a "general equilibrium" exists when three (3) conditions
simultaneously hold: 1) productive efficieny (where maximum output is achieved from
a given set of inputs); 2) efficiency in the product mix (the optimal combination of goods
that should be produced given existing production technology and consumer
tastes); and 3) effciengy in consumption (consumers allocate their income in a way that
maximizes their utility, given their incomes and the prices of goods).
Economic efficiency is best illustrated by the Edgeworth Box Diagram48 in
microeconomics:
LEdgewcth Box iagram
At each efficient point, the RTS (of k for ) is equal in both
x and y production
Total Labor
The- diagram shows the allocation of resources (in this case, capital and
labor) between two (2) persons, Ox and Oy. The diagram maps out the set of
indifference curves of each person. (An indifference curve is a graphical
representation of the individual's set of consumption preferences, or as in this case,
a set of preferences for consuming a bundle including capital and labor.) The
indifference curves of O. are represented in the diagram above by the X-set of
47 VARIAN, op.dt. Note 7 at p. 480.
48Illustration found at http://ihome.ust.hk/-tanjim/econ2OO/econ2OOchl2.ppt#11 (last
visited 15 January 2008).
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convex curves (XI, X2, X1, X4). rhe indifference curves of 0,. are represented by the
Y-set of convex (from Oy 's orientation) curves (Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4).
The set of Pareto efficient allocations is seen from the diagonal line
traversing the origin at O, across points where O,'s indifference curves do not
intersect O.'s indifference curves, to the origin at Or. (Otherwise stated, the set of
bundles preferred by O, does not intersect Oy's preferred bundles of resources.)
This line is known as the Pareto set or contract curve. There is a Pareto efficient
allocation at any point of this curve because there is no way to make O, better off
without making 0. worse off, and vice-versa. In this situation, all of the gains from
trade have been exhausted, such that there is no mutually advantageous exchange of




This mode of exchange (or allocation between resources) is a system of
"pure exchange", where the allocation of resources (capital and labor) between Ox
4")IIb'id
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and OY are made based largely on the preferences of 0, and Oy as shown in their
indifference curves.
B. CREDITOR EXCHANGE UNDER REHABILITATION
WITH COURTS AS "AUCTIONEERS"
Let us transpose the Edgeworth box diagram as an analytical tool for
dissecting the system of creditor exchange in corporate rehabilitations. What kind
of "exchange" occurs, who are the persons involved, and what "resources" are
subject of allocation?
As previously discussed, in a corporate rehabilitation, there is a finite set of
corporate assets that may be used'to defray corporate expenses and pay off
creditors in order to give the corporation the "breathing space" to generate profits
and return to financial solvency. We will distinguish corporate assets only as to
whether they are secured or unsecured assets. The allocation problem facing courts
is to 'ascertain bow much. of secured assets and how much of unsecured assets will
be allocated to pay off secured and unsecured creditors, as would permit continued
operation of the corporation towards full rehabilitation?
Clearly, this situation does not involve a system of "pure exchange" as
described in the previous subsection. Due to its authority to approve valuations (of
corporate assets, corporate debt" and corporate expenses), and its mandate to
ensure. the feasible rehabilitation of the corporation, courts act as proverbial
"auctioneers" who set "prices" (or costs, as-it were) P1 and P2. Both creditor classes
of secured and unsecured creditors receive this set of prices (from either the
Rehabilitation Receiver's valuation, or the court-approved valuation). In turn, the
court's fixing of these prices affects how much of each type of corporate asset
(secured and unsecured) can be allocated to pay off each group of creditors
(secured creditors vis-a-vis unsecured creditors) under the approved rehabilitation
plan.
Creditors' respective demands for repayment of its loan obligation from
the corporation's secured and unsecured assets will be influenced by the "prices"
they receive from the rehabilitation court. A creditor class can expectedly adjust
their demand for repayment from the pool of secured assets and the pool of
unsecured assets upon receiving the Rehabilitation Receiver's valuation of the total
fair market value of corporate assets. Corollarily, the extent of a "haircut" a creditor
class is willing to absorb out of their loan receivable would depend on the valuation
of total corporate assets. The level of debt that a creditor class would accept for
conversion to equity in the corporation - thereby foregoing repayment of the loan
obligation in cash or other similar liquid forms - will likewise be affected by the
court's valuations of corporate assets, corporate debt, and corporate expenses. A
creditor class could therefore accept "haircuts" or debt conversion at the bargaining
process during rehabilitation when the creditor class sees that this is the highest
2007]
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possible recovery it could make on its loan receivable, even by comparison with
liquidation values in insolvency proceedings.
Tius, the "bargaining process" in corporate rehabilitation does not
simulate a system of pure exchange. The "prices" set by rehabilitation courts as
"auctioneers" generates a "budget constraint" on the allocation of resources. When
rehabilitation courts approve valuations of corporate debt, assets, and expenses and
implement the provisions of the Interim Rules (especially the "due regard" and
"adequate protection" clauses for secured creditors), the efficient allocation of the
corporation's secured and unsecured assets can only be made subject to the budget
constraint:-51
Due to the "due regard" and "adequate protection" provisions of the
Interim Rules guaranteeing against impairment of secured creditors' security
interests, rehabilitation courts can never set "prices" or a budget constraint where
unsecured creditors are fully and indiscriminately repaid from secured and
unsecured corporate assets, to the exclusion of secured creditors. Simply put, there
can be no allocation which grants unsecured creditors repayment from all the
secured assets (wheder from income or the disposition of such assets), while
.'Modificd illustration. Original illustration found at:
http://www.aL'ccom. k su.cdu/abicrc/I r',,2OWcb ,2[( )505/l'[xchanjrc'/,2(1liid'/ ,20thc%2Ud201-d'w.dworth/ ,211Bx
,,2ON/n2l9"/,2(2O12.ppt#25 (last visitcd 15 .january 2008).
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secured assets do not receive any repayment from the secured assets. (In the pure
exchange analysis previously discussed, this could still be a Pareto-efficient
allocation if the contract curve commences from the origin. Intuitively, an
allocation that repays unsecured creditors with 100% of secured assets while
secured creditors are not repaid with any of the secured assets would appear to be
Pareto-efficient. At this point, there is no other allocation that would make secured
creditors better off without making unsecured creditors worse off.) The budget
constraint militates against the argument that a court-approved allocation could
contemplate a situation when security interests are destroyed, as when secured
assets are disposed of to repay unsecured creditors and no corresponding
replacement is provided for by the rehabilitation court.
The important result is that rehabilitation courts do not have free rein over
their choice of Pareto-efficient allocations. Due to the constraint generated by the
Interim Rules mandating "due regard" to the interests of secured creditors, and
requiring "adequate protection" for secured creditors with respect to properties
comprising the security, courts would have to approve allocations along the interior
of the Pareto set or contract curve. This means that, in any court-approved
allocation of corporate assets (for debt servicing and corporate assets during
rehabilitation), secured creditors could never be deprived of repayment from
secured assets, even if such secured creditors are induced to accept "haircuts", debt-
equity conversion, or egregious deferments in repayment (as when the court
approves a long repayment term). The rationale of economic efficiency adds weight
to the proposition that security interests cannot be destroyed or invalidated in
corporate rehabilitation.
C. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND THE RUBY INDUSTRIAL DICTUM
Courts, as "auctioneers" in the rehabilitation bargaining process, therefore
have a vital role to play in setting "prices" or costs on creditors' recovery from
corporate assets. The extreme interpretation of the Rub Industrial dictum (putting
secured and unsecured creditors on terms of "equality" as to the corpus of assets
from which repayments can be sourced) does not make economic sense. An
economically efficient-allocation recognizes the in-built constraint institutionally
established under the Interim Rules, through the "due regard" and "adequate
protection" provisions protecting secured creditors.
Obviously, it is not the First Theorem of Welfare Economics ("First
Welfare Theorem") that is implicated in judicial "auctioneering" in corporate
rehabilitations. The First Welfare Theorem states that "any competitive equilibrium
is Pareto-efficient."' In a pure exchange situation where secured creditors and
unsecured creditors only care about their own consumption of corporate resources
5' VARIANP.dt. Note 7 at p. 499.
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(or the satisfaction of their loan obligations from corporate assets), the extreme
interpretation of the Ruby Industrial dictum could result in the destruction of security
interests that could still be deemed "Pareto-efficient". However, this exchange
situation presupposes that each group of creditors (secured and unsecured) truly
behaves competitively and takes prices as given (or are unable to influence such
prices). As observed by law and economics scholars, however, this "first-best"
notion is largely inconsistent with reality:
"x x x That is, all our prescriptions for allocative efficiency are best
only in the constrained sense that we are fully aware that we arc leaving
something out--namely, the distributional consequences of a different
endowment. There is a sense in which this constraint should not be so
troubling. It embodies the post-modern notion that everything is highly
contextualized. First-best and uniquely optimal results are classroom
exercises, not guides to the real world. I listory, political possibility,
geography, custom, and all the other details matter too much to be ignored.
There is no need to speculate on how things might have been if we had been
able to start with a clean slate." 52
What should better reorient judicial perspective in corporate rehabilitations
is the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics ("If all agents have convex
preferences, then there will always be a set of prices such that each Pareto efficient
allocation is a market equilibrium for an appropriate assignment of endowments").5 3
The Second Welfare Theorem recognizes that prices can have roles that are both
allocative (in this case, the relative scarcity of corporate assets), and distributive
(how much of secured and unsecured assets will creditors be permitted to avail of in
the exchange) in nature. A truly efficient allocation by rehabilitation courts should
therefore take into account the true social cost of asset allocation in approving
rehabilitation plans. This includes the cost of preserving security interests - if
secured creditors perceive that the corporate rehabilitation environment in the
Philippines is simply a process that countenances the destruction of security
interests (and worse, without any empirical projection of how and when the debtor
corporation will reach full rehabilitation), secured creditors would be incentivized to
"jump the gun", and file a petition for insolvency against the corporation way ahead
of the filing of any debtor or creditor-initiated petition for rehabilitation. At that
juncture, secured creditors would be well-justified in thinking that loan recovery
from liquidation values of corporate assets (especially from secured assets where
their preferences rank higher than any other creditor) is a far better option than
participating in a long drawn-out and illusory corporate rehabilitation where the
probability of loan recovery is minimal.
Significantly, economic literature has also accepted the concept of
"egalitarian-equivalence" in resource allocations:
2 Id. Note 42, at 196.
" VARIAN op.cit. Note 7 at p. 495.
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"Pazner and Schmeidler formulated the concept of egalitarian-equivalence
to avoid a difficulty they perceived in fairness, a concept of equity that, like
egalitarian equivalence, is ordinal and does not require interpersonal welfare
comparisons. In what follows, an agent who would prefer another agent's bundle
of goods to his own will be said to engy the other agent. An allocation at which no
agent envies another will be afair allocation. 54
By recognizing the need for egalitarian-equivalence in deriving Pareto-
efficient allocations, economics scholars have also devised a set of empirical tools
that can be used to derive the Pareto-efficient egalitarian-equivalent allocation.55
This model could also be applied in corporate rehabilitations. It contains the
procedure for forecasting allocations only involving a few actors who know each
other well (as in the case of secured and unsecured creditors). Clearly, this is more
compatible with conceptions of fairness in a rehabilitation setting. With its helpful
theoretical underpinning to public choice, the model could also be employed by
rehabilitation courts.
Finally, the foregoing analysis does not intend to prop up efficiency
analysis as the primary criterion for evaluating legal rules (or as in this case, the
extreme interpretation of the Ruby Industrial dictum). There are law and economics
scholars who argue that legal rules per se are "not the proper place to pursue
distributional objectives", thus preferring to resolve economic inequality through
income redistribution under direct (and indirect) taxation. 56 While there is ample
room for normative debate on the appropriate mode of economic evaluation of
legal rules, the analysis undertaken here is a simplified presentation of the economic
dimensions of interpreting the Rubj Industrial dictum. The conceptual tools could
vary for as many mathematical methods available. 57
CONCLUSION
As seen from the triage of jurisprudential and legal history, international
best practices, and economic efficiency analysis, "equality" is not "equity" in
corporate rehabilitations --- at least, not in the sense of the extreme interpretation
of the Ruby Industrial dictum favored by unsecured creditors. The legal framework
and genesis of the Interim Rules does not support the destruction of security
interests - especially where destruction leads to a windfall (inadvertent or
deliberate) for unsecured creditors. While the Supreme Court has admittedly not
s4 Crawford, Vincent P. A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Effcient Egataian-Equivaence
Allocations, ECONOMETRICA, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1979), at 49.
s Ibid.
., Sanchirico, Chris William. Deconstructing the New Effidengy Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REv.
1003 (July 2001), at 1007.
s1 See DANAO ROLANDO A. MATHEMATICAL METHODS IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS,
(University of the Philippines Press, 2007).
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yet had occasion to interpret the "due regard" and "adequate protection" clauses of
the Interim Rules, this is certainly not license for unrestrained interpretation by
rehabilitation courts. As critical "auctioneers" who set prices (as well as transaction
costs) in the exchange of creditor demands in the rehabilitation process, courts
must be vigilant in observing the inbuilt constraints of the Interim Rules. Court-
approved allocations of corporate assets, while ultimately designed to lead debtor
corporations to financial health and restoration, should not result in the extreme
externality of depriving creditors of the legal benefits from their security.
Neither can courts ignore the broader moral hazard of driving out secured
creditors from the rehabilitation bargaining process. Rehabilitation courts, while
admittedly vested with considerable powers under the Interim Rules, must likewise
be conscious of the consequences of judicial policy-setting in their interpretation of
the Interim Rules. Particularly since the Supreme Court has not yet issued its final
rules of procedure on corporate rehabilitations, rehabilitation courts must observe
caution in the kind of precedents they generate (especially with respect to the
interpretation of the "due regard" and "adequate protection" clauses for secured
creditors). Perceptions of increased credit risk (due to rehabilitation courts'
manipulation of "prices" or costs of recovery by secured and unsecured creditors)
could crowd out secured creditors from the macroeconomy, and cause such vital
sources of credit to redirect their valuable assets elsewhere.
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ANNEX
(a) Equilibrium in the "exchange"
Let:
A = Unsecured creditors
B Secured creditors
Good 1 = Pool of SECURED ASSETS of debtor corporation
Good 2 = Poll of UNSECURED ASSETS of debtor corporation
Initial Endowment (W, V2) [] creditors' claims from each type of assets
before rehabilitation proceedings were initiated. Creditors rely on their own
valuation of each asset group.
P = price of obtaining recovery from the corporation's pool of unsecured
assets (due to legal expenses, transaction costs, time lags in recovery causing
depreciation)
P2 = price of obtaining recovery from the corporation's pool of secured
assets (due to legal expenses, transactions costs, depreciation, etc.)
REHABILITATION COURT, as "auctioneer", can endogenously
determine prices (e:g. valuation of the total corporate debt burden, percentages of
secured and unsecured assets, and total corporate assets available for debt servicing
imposition of documentation requirement for creditor class to prove entitlement to
claim, delay in proceedings, etc.)
See creditors' respective demand functions:
UNSECURED CREDITORS SECURED CREDITORS
X'A (PI, P2) X'B (PI, P2)
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At equilibrium: court should set prices (P*i, P*2) to equate each set of
"creditors' demands with the total entitlement to the supply of each type of
corporate asset (secured or unsecured asset).
X1A (P, P2*) + X'B (P,* P2*) = WVA + WB
X 2A (Pt, P2*) + X2B (P/*, P 2*) = W2 A + 1VB
Due to the "due regard" and "adequate protection" clauses in the Interim
Rules, X1A (P]*, P2*) d 0
Point at origin of contact curve: Court cannot choose P*, P2* where XtB (P,) P2*) =
W'1A + W1
Creditors' optimal choice given budget constraint (PI and P2 set by the rehabilitation
court)
Assume Cobb-Douglas utility function (convex ICs)
u(x,,w2) = xcx?
Each creditor class must then maximize recovery given the constraint:
max clnx, + dlnx 2 log form
such that PX, + P 2X 2 = m po budget constraint (cost of
recovery of each type of asset
equals total amount m that
creditor can spend to recover
payment from corporate assets)
Setting up the Lagrangian:
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Differentiating (for xI,x2, and A)
=APX, c d
-- PI -- AP2
6L d O since:
x x2  = PPXx 1
or I d = 2P 2 X2
-=PIA + PX 2 -m = 0 then:
c+d2-
m
- o0o -
